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Abstract
Maintaining cyber security is a complex task, utilizing many levels of network information
along with an array of technology. Current practices for combating cyber attacks typically
use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to passively detect and block multi-stage attacks.
Because of the speed and force at which a new type of cyber attack can occur, automated
detection and response is becoming an apparent necessity. Anomaly-based detection sys-
tems, such as statistical-based or clustering algorithms, attempt to address this by analyzing
the relative differences in network and host activity. Signature-based IDS systems are typ-
ically more accurate for known attacks, but require time and resources for an analyst to
update the signature database. This work hypothesizes that the latency from zero-day at-
tack to signature creation can be shortened via anomaly-based algorithms. In particular, the
summarizing ability of clustering is leveraged and examined in its applicability of signature
creation.
This work first investigates a modified density-based clustering algorithm as an IDS,
with its strengths and weaknesses identified. Being able to separate malicious from normal
activity, the modified algorithm is then applied in a supervised way to signature creation.
Lessons learned from the supervised signature creation are then leveraged for the develop-
ment of unsupervised real-time signature classification. Automating signature creation and
classification via clustering turns out satisfactory but with limitations. Density supports for
new signatures via clustering can be diluted and lead to misclassification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber security today is a problem growing more complex with increasing network sizes,
amount of information, and sophistication of attacker methods. One key component of
network analysts’ tools is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). These systems attempt to
analyze both host and network data to detect the presence of occurring malicious activity.
Two prevailing methods of intrusion detection are anomaly-based and signature-based
analyses. Many tools exist using methods from one or both of these categories, and achieve
varying results. In general, anomaly-based algorithms may miss a large volume of abnor-
mal activity and also trigger false positive alarms from legitimate yet rare events. How-
ever, one key advantage of anomaly-based algorithms is that they often require no a priori
knowledge and can therefore theoretically adapt to new attack methods. Signature-based
algorithms usually have a high detection rate, but take time and resources to update the
database of attacks they are reliant on. A plausible approach would be an anomaly-based
method that can update or incorporate signatures either created by an analyst or automati-
cally created from another source.
While much work has been devoted to Intrusion Detection Systems, automatic exam-
ination of host and network data in real time with high accuracy is still not satisfactory.
Many proposed algorithms have not addressed their reliability with varying amounts of
malicious activity or their adaptability for real time use. The ability of a system to perform
and adapt in real time is necessary because attacks can often be automated, and therefore
performed very quickly on a network.
1
This work will extend an existing unsupervised algorithm to real-time use and investi-
gate its performance improvement by incorporating adaptive signatures.
1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) technology monitors both network and host
activities to detect malicious attacks. Network data is collected by ‘sniffing’, or copying,
transmission layer activity at some critical point in a network. Systems that are solely
network based, such as [41], can arguably miss valuable activity occurring internal to a
single host. Alternatively, host data can come from a variety of automatically and explicitly
collected audit logs, depending on the Operating System, configuration, and normal usage
of the host. Because of the variety and volume of this data, it is often unclear as to the best
way to use the vast amount of information available on each host.
The methods that IDSs employ can typically be grouped into two categories: signature-
based and anomaly-based Sensors. Signature-based analyzers compare events against pre-
defined models looking for either specific kinds of events or specific patterns of events.
This method requires one or more experts defining and constantly updating these signa-
tures. Anomaly-based analyzers attempt to identify unusual events or unusual patterns of
events, assuming that cyber attacks produce rare or different effects that appear in network
or host data. Anomaly detection is focused on attempting to catch new attacks as well as
old ones, but it often comes with the cost of being less accurate because of unusual but
legitimate user behavior or varying amounts of malicious activity.
1.1.1 Signature-based Systems
Signature-based intrusion detection is the predominant method in commercially available
IDS systems, e.g., [41, 31, 18]. In a signature-based system, activity is compared to a
variety of specific models that are historically labeled as malicious. A signature-based
IDS will most often have a very high detection rate of known malicious activity due to the
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predictability of many attacks and the precision of the models that is possible. According
to Frederick [13], the following are some commmon examples of signatures with a range
of complexity used in typical IDS technology.
• Connection attempt from a reserved IP address. This is easily identified by checking
the source address field in an IP header.
• Packet with an illegal TCP flag combination. This can be found by comparing the
flags set in a TCP header against known good or bad flag combinations.
• Email containing a particular virus. The IDS can compare the subject of each email
to the subject associated with the virus-laden email, or it can look for an attachment
with a particular name.
• DNS buffer overflow attempt contained in the payload of a query. By parsing the
DNS fields and checking the length of each of them, the IDS can identify an attempt
to perform a buffer overflow using a DNS field. A different method would be to look
for exploit shellcode sequences in the payload.
• Denial of service attack on a POP3 server caused by issuing the same command
thousands of times. One signature for this attack would be to keep track of how
many times the command is issued and to alert when that number exceeds a certain
threshold.
• File access attack on an FTP server by issuing file and directory commands to it
without first logging in. A state-tracking signature could be developed which would
monitor FTP traffic for a successful login and would alert if certain commands were
issued before the user had authenticated properly.
It is clear from the above examples that signatures usually target very specific features
of observed activity. Time and resources are therefore needed for a signature-based IDS
to adapt to new attacks. Because cyber attacks can change drastically in short periods of
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time, signature databases must be updated by analysts frequently. Also, signature-based
IDSs can have varying degrees of sensitivity which may produce varying amounts of false
positives. For example, Patton et al.[34] identified that Snort can have a high false positive
rate. Figure 1.1 shows a system-level diagram of the components of a signature-based IDS.
Becasue an analyst is usually involved in this loop, signatures can take a relatively long
time to be updated. An extremely accurate IDS can also incorporate an automated response,
such as automatic firewall rule creation to block malicious activity, though this technique
is difficult to use reliably without creating a denial of service for legitimate activity.
Figure 1.1: Signature-based IDS
Some systems have been proposed which improve on signature-based IDS performance.
For instance, Carey et al.[5] investigated different methods of pattern matching in a hetero-
geneous signature-based IDS. Other heterogeneous systems discussed later in Section 1.3
employ signature-based methods to achieve high accuracy. However, because of the pre-
cision of signatures which allows them to be highly accurate, new attacks can often go
undetected. Though reliable for detecting known attacks, signature-based systems take
time to adapt to new attacks and can produce floods of false positives.
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1.1.2 Anomaly-based Systems
Anomaly-based detection schemes aim at finding attacks based on their relative differ-
ences to normal activity, and typically use statistical profiling, clustering, or other machine
learning techniques. Figure 1.2 shows a diagram of a typical ‘supervised’ anomaly-based
system. A system that uses a model created from training data is typically refered to as a
supervised method because it requires that the training data be labeled as ground truth by an
analyst. Though not all anomaly-based algorithms are inherently supervised, any method
which relies on a model which is compared to observed activity must create this model
under supervision. Without the components in Figure 1.2 labeled under ‘Supervision’, an
anomaly-based method would rely on the differences in the observed activity alone, and
not differences between the observed activity and historical activity.
Figure 1.2: Anomaly-based IDS
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In a Statistical Profiling analysis, normal user behavior is defined in terms of the statis-
tics for different kinds of events. These statistics are collected during an initial supervised
profiling stage. Typically, if the observed statistics deviate from these numbers, then an
alert is triggered. Some well-known systems rely on this type of anomaly detection on
many levels [18, 35, 38, 23, 24, 21].
There are, however, some inherent problems with statistical profiling. If the data used
to train a normal behavior model contains malicious activity, it may become part of the
model in such a way that it can never be detected later in real analysis. Statistical profiling
is also vulnerable to profile drift. If normal behavior changes over time, as it often will,
it may be regarded as malicious because the profile is out of date. Some methods attempt
to address this, though it is difficult to gauge how these adjustments would perform in
every scenario. Finally, like any anomaly-based system, statistical profiling is vulnerable
to varying amounts of malicious activity. A large steady amount of malicious activity
could deceive the IDS into eventually labeling it as normal. These problems require more
sophisticated methods to reliably detect malicious activity.
Another category of Intrusion Detection methods include machine Learning techniques
such as neural networks and Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). Like statistical profiling,
these techniques attempt to learn either malicious or normal behavior. Machine Learning,
however, learns the characteristics of the behavior, and not just the relative frequency of
its occurance. For instance, neural networks describe a classification system as a series of
small decisions. This model is trained using ground truth to describe behavior by identi-
fying the series of decisions more frequently made when presented with a type of activity.
These paths can then be used as a model for comparison to observed activity.
Another category of anomaly-based intrusion detection is clustering algorithms. These
often unsupervised methods attempt to group data based on similarity measures determined
over a high dimensionality in hopes of isolating interesting groups of data possibly in sub-
spaces not obvious to an analyst. Like any anomaly-based system, clustering aims at cap-
turing new and evolving attacks as quickly as possible by identifying the relative differences
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between normal and malicious data. Clustering has been used in data mining for decades in
various domains, though it has only recently been applied to intrusion detection. It has not
yet made its way into popular commercial tools probably due to unreliable performance,
though clustering is still a topic of IDS research [15, 51, 32, 39, 40, 19, 12, 26].
Because clustering often does not examine temporal relationships between data points,
it is not susceptible to any kind of profile drift. However, like many truly anomaly-based
detection systems, clustering is often based on the assumption that malicious activity is
in fact anomalous. This assumption makes it vulnerable to varying amounts of malicious
activity. This characteristic along with its lack of supervision can often make performance
heavily reliant on user parameters. In order for clustering to be of practical use in intrusion
detection, it must demonstrate that it can be reliable and also be useful for detecting new
kinds of attacks. Clustering algorithms are not reliant on a priori knowledge, and can usu-
ally summarize many high-dimensional data points, which makes them a point of interest
in the intrusion detection community.
1.2 Clustering Algorithms
Clustering algoriths by themselves have been used for decades as summarizing tools for
large data sets. When applied to anomaly-based IDS systems, they attempt to find anoma-
lies within data by grouping it in such a way that unusual data points are left by themselves
or in small clusters. These anomalies are often harder to spot by an analyst manually be-
cause the clusters are formed from subspaces within the data set. Oh and Lee [33] point
out that because statistical profiling attempts to summarize a user’s behavior, it can become
very inaccurate when the normal behavior’s deviation is large. Clustering provides a ma-
jor advantage over other algorithms because it identifies both outliers and dense regions
in a data space without using a priori knowledge. The best clustering algorithm for intru-
sion detection purposes will therefore use the most amount of information in a data set to
distinguish between malicious and normal activity.
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Currently, there are many clustering algorithms across many different data mining ap-
plications. One species of clustering algorithms uses distance as a similarity measure when
forming clusters. Many different kinds of distance formulas that can be used in a clas-
sifier are identified by Luke [27], including Euclidian, Manhattan, Chebyschev, Squared
Chi-squared, and Canberra distances, as well as formulas based on Cosine Similarities and
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient. K-means [28] is one distance-based algorithm that led
to the development of many others [15, 32, 48, 50, 16, 36, 52]. Typically, data is grouped
around established cluster centroids, the number and location of which may be determined
iteratively. Though using this kind of similarity measure is intuitive for data existing within
the real numbers, it is not clear how symbolic fields, such as protocol (e.g. ’tcp’), should
be used. Since symbolic fields are common in both network and host logs, many distance-
based algorithms solve this problem by assigning a constant value to the distance between
two symbolic points. Because it is not readily clear what this constant value should be,
distance-based clustering algorithms do not effectively use the information contained in
these fields.
The opposite species of clustering algorithms is the density-based approach, which in-
cludes work such as [1, 11, 30, 14, 46]. A density-based approach requires a user parameter
that indicates a density threshold, which specifies howmany instances of a value are needed
for that value to be considered ’dense’. Clusters are then formed by analyzing the dense
regions of a data set. It is less intuitive how to measure the similarity of any two data points
in a density-based cluster, though it can be argued that each data point in a cluster is equally
far apart. Measuring inter-cluster distances would require another density based analysis of
the formed clusters, which can conceivably be useful. Because density-based approaches
are dependent on a user parameter and also summarize information in determining dense
subspaces in the data, it could be argued that they do not necessarily take advantage of all
of the information of every field in the data set. However, density-based algorithms are
better suited to using fields with symbolic values.
Clustering algorithms may also exhibit other characteristics, such as their usefulness
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for real-time use. Some algorithms [32, 4, 3] address this issue either by treating log data
as a data stream or by otherwise analyzing data with a temporal aspect. Other algorithms
[51, 40, 12, 26] use other methods such as genetic selection and fuzzy logic to enhance
clustering performance.
In general, clustering has been shown in some algorithms to perform well as an IDS,
though for small, specially selected data sets. Regardless of the proposed enhancements to
Clustering algorithms over the years, no existing methods clearly show their performance
for varying amounts of heterogeneous malicious activity. A simple algorithm is needed
with intuitive improvements available to show the ability of a clustering algorithm’s ability
to separate malicious and normal activity, and the significance of the improvements to these
algorithms.
1.2.1 Simple Log-file Clustering Tool
The clustering algorithm selected is a simple density-based approach proposed by Risto
Vaarandi [46]. In his paper, he refers to the software that implements his algorithm as the
Simple Log-file Clustering Tool (SLCT), which we will adopt as the name of the algoritm
itself. Vaarandi argues that a density-based approach takes advantage of the structure of
log files, where a distance-based algorithm does not. SLCT was designed simply as a log
analysis tool to aid a user in summarizing a data set. However, we propose to investigate
it’s use in a number of ways, including as a stand-alone IDS.
Vaarandi’s algorithm has many advantages over other methods for our purposes. One
benefit is its simplicity. Implementation of the algorithm is easily constructed, and areas
for fitting the algorithm to intrusion detection are apparent, including real-time adaptation.
Clusters are also formed in such a way as to maximize their fixed attributes, or in other
words, by finding the largest possible subspaces. This means that the most information
possible for a density-based approach is used from the data set.
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1.3 Combining Signature Analysis with Clustering
Both signature-based and anomaly-based methods have advantages and disadvantages.
Signature-based methods, while often more accurate, require time and effort to update their
signatures. Anomaly-based methods, though vulnerable to varying amounts and types of
normal and malicious activity, can adapt to new attacks because their detection method
is based on a relative approach. To take advantage of both types of intrusion detection,
one approach is to use reliable signatures created from a supervised clustering algorithm,
while updating them based on the results of a similar unsupervised clustering technique.
Signatures must be updated in a way that retains the signatures’ useful information, while
adapting to changing attack methods.
Some existing systems attempt to combine the advantages of both types of systems.
One approach is to use a supervised anomaly-based system to create signatures that are
later used for detection [49, 25]. Some systems propose combining separate processes
of signature- and anomaly- based methods to decrease false positive rates [47, 9]. When
trained correctly, these systems can be very accurate. These works do not provide, how-
ever, schemes for updating signatures automatically. Other systems propose using artificial
intelligence and other machine learning techniques to adapt an intrusion detection model
[2, 29, 6]. Though these systems are adaptive, not all of them demonstrated their accuracy
with a range of heterogeneous dynamic activity.
In commercial Intrusion Detection Systems, new signatures are often formed by an ex-
pert using network or audit data that was determined to be malicious. Automating this
process in an unsupervised way therefore requires some reasoning that can reconcile exist-
ing signatures with new attack data identified by an anomaly-based system. We define a
signature as a format for malicious or normal activity, having one or more fixed attributes.
Because of imperfect signatures and changing attack methods however, new information
identified as malicious or normal must update, add to, or invalidate existing signatures to
reflect current methods.
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Though much work has previously been done in the field of intrusion detection, new in-
novations are needed to keep up with constantly changing attack methods. Many signature-
and anomaly-based systems exist using a variety of techniques. Systems that combine the
two obtain good performance, but do not automate the adaptation process. The proposed
work is different from existing methods in that it retains the integrity of proven signature-
based methods, while attempting to automatically adapt to new attack methods, thus at-
tempting to reduce the latency between attack occurrence and signature creation.
1.4 Problem Statement
The work will address specific problems by applying different algorithms to intrusion de-
tection. First, it is necessary to determine if a density-based clustering algorithm such
as SLCT is useful as a stand-alone IDS. The goals of many studies mentioned above have
been to create a successful Anomaly-based IDS. Many have claimed good performance, but
have not clearly shown reliability in scenarios that exhibit characteristics of changing activ-
ity encountered in the real world. Though not initially proposed as an IDS by Vaarandi, it is
unknown whether SLCT or any other clustering-based IDS can achieve good performance
without relying on user parameters or the content of the data being tested.
Regardless of whether SLCT can perform as an IDS by itself or not, its simple but
powerful nature warrants further investigation into its possible uses. One such use may be
the supervised creation of IDS signatures by utilizing the inherent summarizing nature of
the algorithm. What is more, SLCTmay be able to aid in the classificaton of new signatures
in real time. Investigating SLCT can hopefully provide insight into the usefulness of data
mining applications in the automation of cyber security.
In summary, the tasks for this work are as follows:
1. Test SLCT as a stand-alone IDS, by applying it in different ways. Try to determine
the best possible user parameter configuration.
2. Test SLCT as a signature-creation algorithm using labeled ground truth.
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3. Determine SLCT’s ability to classify unknown signatures in a dynamic data set.
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Chapter 2
Design and Implementation
This chapter discusses the design and implementation of the proposed work. The sys-
tem consists of three components: Clustering-based IDS, Signature Creation and Signature
Analysis, and Adaptive Signatures. The first component is designed to investigate SLCT’s
usefulness as a stand-alone IDS. The second component assesses the clustering algorithm’s
ability to create signatures from labeled ground truth. The third component addresses clus-
tering used as a summarizing agent to help classify new kinds of incoming data. Section
2.4 discusses the implementation of the system. Throughout this chapter, data will refer to
any log file, and clustering will refer to the algorithm proposed by Vaarandi, named SLCT.
2.1 Clustering-based IDS
This section will first describe the algorithm originally proposed by Risto Vaarandi as a
log-analysis tool named SLCT. Its adoption as a stand-alone IDS will then be discussed.
2.1.1 The SLCT Algorithm
Let a data point be a single log file entry and its attributes are the words contained in it.
The following definitions are made. The data space has a dimensionality of n, where n is
the maximum number of attributes in a data point, where each attribute belongs to a field,
fi. We call Λ the set of all possible fields in the data, or, Λ = {f1, ..., fn}. A region S is
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a subset of the data space, where certain attributes i1,...,ik (1 ≤ k ≤ n) of all points that
belong to S have identical values v1,...,vk:
∀x ∈ S, xi1 = v1, ..., xik = vk (2.1)
We call the set (v1,i1),...,(vk,ik) the set of fixed attributes of region S. If k=1 (i.e., there
is just one fixed attribute), the region is called a 1-region. A dense region is a region that
contains at least N points (defined as a percentage of the total log lines), where N is the
support threshold value given by the user [46]. A region, i.e., a set of fixed attributes, is
referred to as a cluster candidate if it contains at least one dense 1-region.
In preliminary experiments, it was determined that not all fields in Λ are necessarily
useful for SLCT’s operation. Therefore, we call Λ′ the subset of Λ that was selected by the
user that defines the fields which attributes may be used to define a region S. For reference,
Table 2.1 summarizes the terms used in clustering throughout this thesis.
The SLCT algorithm consists of three steps: building a data summary, defining cluster
candidates, and refining clusters. The first step, the pseudo-code for which can be found in
Figure 2.1, identifies dense 1-regions, which are essentially words that occur in at least N
percent of lines (the position in the log file line is also considered). A hash table or map
can be used to efficiently store these values in [position, value] form. The number of times
a [word, position] pair is found in a log line is known as the support value.
The next step, found in Figure 2.2 which is concerned with defining cluster candidates,
iterates over each line checking for dense 1-regions. If a data point contains one or more
of the identified frequent words, a cluster candidate is formed or the existing cluster candi-
date’s support value is incremented. Vaarandi [46] explains this best:
. . . if the line belongs tom dense 1-regions that have fixed attributes (v1,i1),
. . . , (vm,im), then the cluster candidate is a region with the set of fixed attributes
(v1,i1), . . . , (vm,im). For example, if the line is Connection from 192.168.1.1,
and there exist a dense 1-region with the fixed attribute (1, ’Connection’) and
another dense 1-region with the fixed attribute (’from’, 2), then a region with
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Symbol Term Description
w 1-region A single value or word contained in a log file line.
Φ Cluster A cluster candidate whose support is above the sup-
port threshold.
φ Cluster candidate One or more fixed attributes that describes one or
more similar log lines.
L Data point A single line of information in a log file containing
multiple fields.
W Dense 1-region A 1-region whose support is greater than the support
threshold, N .
D Dictionary The list of 1-regions and their supports.
n Dimensionality The number of fields in a log file.
fk Field A type of information in a data point with a specific
position (e.g. ’protocol’).
Λ′ Field Selection The set of fields which are considered when cluster-
ing.
(vk,ik) Fixed attribute A [value, position] pair, many of which make a clus-
ter definition.
σ Set of Cluster candidates The set of all current cluster candidates.
N Support threshold The user parameter which specifies a percentage of
the total log lines.
sw, sc Support values The number of data points that contain the 1-region
or belong to the cluster candidate.
Table 2.1: Description of Clustering Terms
WHILE (L 6= NULL)
FOR (a ∈ L.attributes)
IF(a ∈ Λ′ )
IF(a ∈ D )
D.UpdateAttributeSupport(a)
ELSE
D.Add(a)
END IF
END IF
END IF
NUMLINES ++
L = NextLine()
END WHILE
Figure 2.1: SLCT Stage 1: build Dictionary (D)
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the set of fixed attributes (’Connection’, 1), (’from’, 2) becomes the cluster
candidate [46].
In this way, each log line is assigned to exactly one cluster candidate. Let σ represent the
set of these candidates.
ResetInput()
L = NextLine()
WHILE (L 6= NULL)
φ = new cluster
FOR(a ∈ L.attributes)
IF(a.support/NUMLINES ≥ N )
φ.attributes.Add(a)
END IF
END FOR
IF (φ.attributes.Count > 0)
φ.members.Add(L)
IF (φ ∈ σ)
φ.support++
ELSE
σ.Add(φ)
END IF
ELSE
Anomalies.Add(L)
END IF
L = NextLine()
END WHILE
Figure 2.2: SLCT Stage 2: build set of cluster candidates (σ)
The third step, found in Figure 2.3 which refines cluster candidates into valid clusters,
involves simply iterating over the cluster candidates to check their support value. If the
support value, as a percent of total activity, is less than the user-defined support threshold
N , then it is not considered a cluster. Vaarandi also proposes an iterative solution to fine
tuning the support threshold. Clustering results may heavily depend on the threshold N ,
and therefore will be chosen based on extensive experimentation.
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FOR (φ ∈ σ)
IF (φ.support/NUMLINES ≥ N )
φ.valid = true (φ→ Φ)
FOR (L ∈ Φ.members)
AssignClusteredStatus(L)
END FOR
FOR (L ∈ Anomalies)
AssignAnomalyStatus(L)
END FOR
END IF
END FOR
Figure 2.3: SLCT Stage 3: select valid clusters
2.1.2 Application of SLCT: Legitimate Clusters
Intuitively, cyber attacks are assumed to be anomalous. This assumption is made by many
related works mentioned above, and leads to the conclusion that any activity belonging to
valid clusters created by SLCT must be normal activity. Any data that does not belong to
any cluster must therefore be malicious activity. The functionAssignClusteredStatus(L)
therefore sets L’s status to normal, and AssignAnomalyStatus(L) sets L’s status to mali-
cious. This method of using SLCT to classify unknown data by labeling members of valid
clusters as normal activity we will refer to as SLCT-norm.
2.1.3 Application of SLCT: Malicious Clusters
Alternatively, regarding clusters created by SLCT as malicious activity may at first seem
counter-intuitive, but there are many reasons why this method is justified. Normal activity
is often harder to describe than malicious activity. One potential reason for this is that there
are significantly more types of normal activity performed by an average host or network
than there are types of known malicious activities that are effective. Cyber attacks are
also often automated, making the activity produced very predictable. This automation,
which can make an attack more effective and more destructive, can therefore be used to our
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advantage. Indeed, a signature-based IDS system is built on the concept of detecting the
recognizable pattern of malicious activity. If SLCT is concerned with grouping together
similar data, then it follows that malicious activity will most certainly form a cluster if the
activity forms a significant enough part of the observed data.
One clear problem with this method is that not only malicious but also normal activity
will form clusters. However, if we assume that a cluster contains either mostly malicious
or mostly normal activity, the problem then simplifies to differentiating between clusters.
This assumption will later be verified, justifying our simplification of the problem. One
characteristic of a cluster is that the number of fixed attributes in a cluster describes how
similar the data in the cluster is: a higher number of fixed attributes indicates a higher
degree of similarity. Given the automated, and therefore patterned nature of malicious
activity, we assert that clusters formed from malicious activity often contain more fixed
attributes than clusters formed from normal activity. If this is the case, then separating
malicious clusters from normal clusters becomes a problem of separating clusters with
more fixed attributes from the ones with less.
For this purpose, a new user parameter, M , is introduced that specifies the percent of
fixed attributes out of the maximum possible that a valid cluster is required to have. AnM
value of 0 will allow a cluster to be formed regardless of the number of fixed attributes. Set-
tingM to a higher value will ideally eliminate all normal clusters leaving only the malicious
ones, and thus classifying the original data. We will refer to this method using theM pa-
rameter as a similarity filter on a mixed group of clusters as SLCT attack. Figure 2.4 shows
the final stage of SLCT modified to use theM parameter, with the modification shown in
bold. The only differences between SLCT norm and SLCT attack are this modification, as
well as the functions AssignClusteredStatus(L) and AssignAnomalyStatus(L). For
SLCT attack, AssignClusteredStatus(L) sets each cluster member to malicious, and
AssignAnomalyStatus(L) sets each non-clustered line to normal. For SLCT norm, it
is the opposite.
Using SLCT in these two different methods should provide insight into the usefulness
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FOR (φ ∈ σ)
IF (φ.support > N AND φ.attributes.count ≥M)
φ.valid = true (φ→ Φ)
FOR (L ∈ Φ.members)
AssignClusteredStatus(L)
END FOR
FOR (L ∈ Anomalies)
AssignAnomalyStatus(L)
END FOR
END IF
END FOR
Figure 2.4: SLCT Stage 3 withM Parameter
of a simple density-based clustering algorithm as an Intrusion Detection System. Because
a density-based clustering algorithm simply classifies data based on relative differences, it
may also be useful for creating IDS signatures from a labeled data set. In other words, if
the classification of data has already been performed, SLCT may be useful in summarizing
the characteristics of both normal and malicious activity, instead of trying to distinguish
between the two.
2.2 Signature Analysis and Signature Creation
Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems make use of misuse models, or attack sig-
natures instead of a relative approach. They rely on a set of signatures that attempts to
describe every known cyber attack that could be carried out. One obvious flaw is that it is
impossible to precisely describe new kinds of future exploits, otherwise countermeasures
would already be in place. However, because a signature-based system can describe known
attacks precisely, they often have very high detect rates. It is therefore essential to the sys-
tem that the set of signatures is as comprehensive as possible given the set of historical
data.
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2.2.1 Siganture Analysis
For our purposes, a signature is similar to a cluster in that it contains a number of [value,position]
attributes that describes activity. Activity matches a signature when all of the attributes in
the signature match the corresponding values in the fields indicated by the positions in
the signature. Other methods of matching signatures to activity can be investigated in fu-
ture work. A signature conflict arises when there are two signatures that match the same
activity with the same number of attributes. These attributes must be associated with dif-
ferent fields, otherwise the two signatures would be the same signature. There should be
no conflicts between signatures created during the Signature Creation algorithm. For con-
flicts between historical signatures created during training and signatures classified by the
New Signature Classification algorithm, discussed in Section 2.3, the historical signatures
always take precedence.
2.2.2 Clustering for Signature Creation
To make the set of signatures as complete as possible, we propose employing SLCT to
create clusters and therefore signatures from a set of labeled training data. A density-based
clustering algorithm can be used as a tool which summarizes activity. The result of SLCT
is essentially a set of groups representing the commonalities existing in the data, as well
as identifying the data that is not sufficiently similar to any other data. Using this premise,
we can apply SLCT to creating signatures that can later be used to identify malicious and
normal activity.
In the IDS community, a labeled data set refers to data where each piece of data has a
status associated with it: either a specific kind of attack or an occurrence of normal activity.
If there are T attack types, let Ω be the set of all attack types {t1, t2,. . . , tT}, where ti is
the ith type. Given a data set that contains a mix of malicious and normal activity that has
been labeled we can seperate the data into T subsets corresponding to each type of attack.
For each of these subsets, we can run SLCT to find the existing commonalities that exist
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for that type of attack. The fixed attributes of the clusters produced from this method are
then considered signatures. Signatures can be created from the set of normal lines as well.
2.2.3 Iterative Parameter Selection
One apparent problem with applying SLCT as a summarizing agent is the selection of the
user parameter N to ensure that the highest amount of data is summarized. We assert that
the more data successfully summarized, the higher the detection rate will be. An N value
too high may exclude many lines from valid clusters, creating false negatives, whereas an
N value too small will create too many clusters and thus defeat the purpose of summarizing
the data. We address this by making the clustering process iterative based on the percent of
data clustered, ρ. If the amount of data clustered is not above a threshold percent, the value
of N is divided in half and SLCT is re-run on the data. It was found that a ρ threshold of
90% was sufficient to create signatures characteristic of the data represented. If, of course,
the specified amount of data cannot be clustered without reducing the valid cluster support
threshold to 1 member, an error is reported. In that case, the type of data could not be
summarized by SLCT using the field selection chosen. Using this iterative process aims at
producing a high detection rate while keeping the number of signatures to a minimum.
2.2.4 Signature Validation
Validation of these signatures is also important in obtaining reliable signatures. Given that
the data is separated into training and testing data, we can exclude part of the training data
from the signature creation process and instead use it for validating the signatures.
In our Signature Creation algorithm, validation will be used to reduce false positives
by selecting different sets of fields for clustering. This approach is based on the premise
that not all fields in the data are needed or necessarily useful in creating good signatures.
A smaller number of fields will provide a more general summary of the data, allowing
signatures to be effective despite small changes in the data. A larger number of fields will
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yield a more specific description of the data, ideally reducing false positives, but becoming
more resistant to variations in the same type of data. The validation process will start
with the smallest, and therefore most general field selection. The field selection will get
iteratively larger, and more specific, until the false positive rate is sufficiently low. The
entire signature creation algorithm is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
FOR (t ∈ Ω)
setk = AllLinesOfType(t)
END FOR
setnormal = AllLinesOfType(”normal”)
FOR (t ∈ Ω)
goCluster = true
Λ′ = NextF ieldSelection()
WHILE (goCluster)
SLCT (setk)
IF (ρ ≥ 90%)
Signatures = SLCT.validClusters
results = SignatureAnalysis(validationSet, Signatures)
IF (results.falsePos ≤ .00001× validationSet.numLines)
goCluster = false
ELSE
Λ′ = NextF ieldSelection()
END IF
ELSE
N = N/2
END IF
END WHILE
totalSignatures += Signatures
END FOR
SLCT (setnormal)
totalSignatures+ = SLCT.validClusters
results = SignatureAnalysis(validationSet, totalSignatures)
Report(attack − normal signature conflicts)
Figure 2.5: Signature Creation Algorithm
Once the entire Signature Creation algorithm finishes, the ideal results are at least one
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signature for each kind of attack, plus at least one signature representing the normal activity
contained in the data. Any conflict between a normal signature and attack signature is
reported as an error. In this case, the algorithm could not create signatures for the attack
type that can distinguish them from normal activity. The signatures can then be used to
identify malicious and normal activity in the testing portion of the data. Though this process
attempts to find the best signatures among a labeled data set, the signatures are static.
Adapting these signatures to changes in the data is the more interesting part of this work.
2.3 Adaptive Signatures
Signatures used in a commercial IDS must be constantly updated to reflect changes in at-
tacker methods. This process is often performed by an analyst, with the latency commonly
on the order of days, or a week. This work investigates a method that attempts to incor-
porate attack information into the signatures immediately after the attack has occurred by
using clustering.
Unlike some algorithms which attempt to use clustering as an anomaly-based sensor, we
propose to use its summarizing abilities like those demonstrated in the Signature Creation
Algorithm. In order to take advantage of density-based clustering, we utilize our previous
assumption that clusters contain either mostly malicious or mostly normal activity. We also
assume that there is a working set of signatures that must be updated to reflect a new type
of activity present in the data.
First, attack and normal signatures that correspond to valid clusters are created from
historical labeled data. These signatures define the known attack types, as well as a subset
of the possible normal activity. New data enters the system in chunks, or windows. The
size of this window can be important, which we will refer to as ψ. This could be achieved
in a real system by periodically polling at a set rate in time. Each window is first clustered.
The supports for new and existing words and cluster candidates are updated to form new or
modified clusters. These clusters become the new set of signatures, which are then used to
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analyze the same window. A set of challenges arise when considering this process.
2.3.1 Real-time Adaptation
First, clustering is by nature a post-processing, or data-mining application. For our pur-
poses, we must adapt SLCT to real-time use while retaining a low computational com-
plexity. We achieve this by introducing smoothing constants, α and β, to both the words’
support and cluster candidates’ support, respectively. In a window, the new support for a
word and cluster candidate become:
sw = swα+ s
′
w(1− α) (2.2)
sc = scβ + s
′
c(1− β) (2.3)
where sw and sc are the current supports, and s′w and s
′
c are the new supports calculated
from the new window. In this way we can continuously cluster incoming cyber data with-
out having to process the entire history of data, and we refer to this modification of the
algorithm as SLCT RT (real time).
In order to approximate a real-time flow of data, further modifications to the method
that reads in data was incorporated to adjust for the amount of data produced by a single
attack. We previously defined a window as representing the data collected in a set amount
of time. Therefore, some types of attacks which produce a large amount of log lines could
skew a large number of windows. For example, a DoS attack such as neptune is aimed
at flooding the network with traffic in a short amount of time. If a window represents a
set amount of time, and if the window size in number of lines was kept constant, many
successive windows would contain only these instances of neptune, making it seem like
the attack takes a lot longer in time than it actually does. This would not be a realistic
approximation in keeping with the rest of the data, where some attacks occur completely
within one window surrounded by normal activity. To correct for this, the code that reads
in the data was modified so that the window size only applies to normal lines. This confines
consecutive attack lines completely to one window. It could be argued that this method is
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both realistic and unrealistic, depending on the interpretation of one window, and how this
approximation relates to a real-world scenario. If the system polled every one second, for
instance, this would be an unrealistic approximation because it is unlikely that an entire
attack would occur within this time frame.
In addition, to emulate varying amounts of activity, the size of each window is randomly
chosen which centers around the mean window size ψ, specified by the user. This method
was adopted because a constant amount of normal activity is fairly unrealistic for most
hosts and networks. Both randomly choosing a window size and making attacks atomic
within one window make up the component we will refer to as the Real-Time Emulator.
Applying a varying window size to only normal lines attempts to describe the process
of collecting data from a set amount of time. For instance, a window size of 100 normal
lines might correspond to 1 minute. Though approximating real time by observing data in
windows may not accurately emulate polling data at a set rate, modifications were made to
achieve the best possible approximation using the data set available.
2.3.2 New Signature Classification
Another problem with real time signature creation and adaptation is the classification of
new signatures. After a window of data has been clustered, the set of fixed attributes for
each cluster makes up the set of signatures. Many of these signatures will already have
a label from the training phase. Any signature that has not been previously discovered is
classified in the following way. Each word, or 1-region, in the dictionary has what is called
an attack support. This value corresponds to the amount of data out of the total whose
signature has contained the particular word and has already been classified as an attack.
For instance, if the data is:
Red, blue, green : attack
yellow, blue, white : normal
red, grey, red : attack
purple, blue, black: attack
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then the attribute (Blue, 2) would have an attack support of 0.667 because two of three
pieces of data that contained the attribute were labeled as attacks. A classification for an
unknown signature can therefore be given by taking the average of the attack supports for
the signature. If this average is over a specified confidence, then the signature is for a new
attack, else, it is normal. The nominal value of this confidence is of course 0.5, though
a higher value may be used to possibly reduce false positives. Given a cluster that is yet
unclassified, this process can be found in Figure 2.6.
newSignature = Φ
FOR (a ∈ Φ.attributes)
sum = sum+ a.attackSupport
END FOR
IF( sum/Φ.attributes.Count ≥ confidence )
newSignature.status = newattack
ELSE newSignature.status = normal
Signatures.Add(newSignature)
Figure 2.6: Signature Classification Algorithm
This method of classifying new signatures is contingent upon the assertion that at-
tributes in the data are indicative of the status of the data. In other words, the process
relies on an attribute occurring in mostly malicious or mostly normal activity. For our pur-
poses, we will use ground truth to train the attributes’ attack supports, and maintain those
values throughout real time execution. The update of those attack supports could be done
by an analyst or automatically based on the new signatures created.
2.4 Implementation of Proposed Work
All software was written in Microsoft Visual C# .NET on the Microsoft Visual Studio plat-
form. Visual C# was the langauge chosen because it offers a very easily built GUI while
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maintaining an organized Object Oriented Programming environment. A framework was
built which allowed for rapid development of different algorithms, inputs, and outputs with
easily configurable user parameters for each. For instance, each algorithm of interest was
implemented as a subclass of a generic Algorithm Manager superclass. Figure 2.7 below
shows a simplified version of the system diagram that represents the essential components
of the software system that addresses the tasks listed in Section 1.4.
Figure 2.7: System Diagram
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Chapter 3
Experiment Setup
3.1 Logs and Other Audit Data
On any computer network, there are many sources of information that could potentially
be beneficial to an IDS. Some of this information is automatically logged, while others
can be collected with specific tools. Though there is a vast amount of information, it is
questionable as to how many sources would be of use in an IDS. These sources are usually
divided into two categories: network-based and host-based.
Current IDS technology is usually focused on network-based sources, such as TCP
traffic dumps. Although it is more or less accepted that network traffic contains enough
information to identify malicious activity, one of the main reasons for this type of system
is that it affords an easily scalable central IDS. However, network data does not constitute
the whole picture, rather it isjust a reflection of what is actually occurring on one or more
hosts.
Host data is slightly harder to make use of, due mostly to its large volume across a net-
work. In fact, a single Windows server alone can contain the Application, Security, System,
Directory Service, File Replication, and DNS Server logs, as well as the System Registry,
System Call History and possibly Command History [45, 44, 43, 42]. The firewalls in a
network can also provide their logs for analysis. Because of the volume and complexity of
available host information, it is often unclear how it would be used in a useful and efficient
IDS.
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Though many types of network and host data can be collected in a real network, there
are a few sets of data available that are recognized as being well suited for intrusion de-
tection and prevention studies. Competitions, such as Defcon’s Capture The Flag [8] and
the KDD Cup [17], are often set up to test the abilities of public and private sector special-
ists. These data sets usually contain low-level data such as TCP dumps or some derivative
thereof. These types of data sets are the best suited for our purposes, because it is at this
low level that we are trying to adaptively detect intrusions.
3.1.1 The KDD Data Set
The 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set [22], produced by MIT’s Lin-
coln Laboratories, includes disk dumps, network data, and audit logs from a simulated net-
work where both legitimate and malicious activities were present. The network consisted
of thousands of simulated hosts, with many common services available to both internal and
external networks. However, ground truth for any of the available data sets is difficult to de-
termine. Fortunately, analysts have processed the TCP data into data that contains labeled
ground truth.
This processed data is the KDD Cup 1999 data set, formed for use in the Third In-
ternational Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition [17]. The data set
is a set of ‘connection’ records formed from MIT’s DARPA sniffed network data. These
connection records, numbering about five million, are labeled as either being normal or
one of 21 different types of attacks from the following four categories: Denial of Service
(DOS), Remote to Local (R2L), User to Root (U2R), and Serveillance / Probing. These
attacks can be found in Table 3.1. The KDD data set does not contain time stamps or any
temporal information besides the ‘duration’ field (index 0). The Real-time Emulator, de-
scribed in Section 2.3.1, therefore attempts to approximate real time from these timeless
‘connections’.
A DoS attack involves flooding a host or network with meaningless traffic, disrupting
regular services. This type of attack can often resemble normal activity in the TCP header,
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Category Attack Type
back
neptune
Denial of Service (DoS) ping of death (pod)
smurf
land
teardrop
ftp write
warezclient
warezmaster
Remote to Local (R2L) phf
multihop
spy
imap
guess passwd
buffer overflow
User to Root (U2R) loadmodule
perl
rootkit
ipsweep
Surveillance / probing nmap
satan
portsweep
Table 3.1: Attack Types
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but the amount of traffic and other statistics can lead to an obvious detection. Remote to
Local attacks involve a remote user trying to gain access to a host, such as by password
guessing. This also may resemble normal activity, though it has distinguishable temporal
differences from normal activity. User to Root attacks are privelage-escalation attacks that
often take the form of some type of buffer overflow. Though these attacks started out
being performed by manually modifying TCP packets, they can now be highly automated.
Finally, surveillance attacks are exactly as the name implies: gaining information about a
network and the services it provides. Port scanning is the most common method in this
category, and can be detected by the obvious pattern of port increments.
The KDD data set contains 41 fields partitioned into three categories: TCP (0-8), con-
tent (9-21), and traffic data (22-40). Descriptions for these fields can be found in Tables
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Traffic data is computed over a 2 second window. Also, besides being
conveniently labeled for use in ground truth comparison, the KDD data set is widely used
in intrusion detection studies.
Field Name Description Type
duration length (number of seconds) of the connection continuous
protocol type type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc. discrete
service network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, etc. discrete
src bytes number of data bytes from source to destination continuous
dst bytes number of data bytes from destination to source continuous
flag normal or error status of the connection discrete
land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise discrete
wrong fragment number of “wrong” fragments continuous
urgent number of urgent packets continuous
Table 3.2: TCP Fields Descriptions
3.2 Test Data Modifications
In order to properly test the proposed work described in Chapter 2, modifications were
made to the KDD data. The modifications retain the characteristics of the data, such as the
relative amounts of different types of attacks. The new data sets include those that contain
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Field Name Description Type
hot number of “hot” indicators continuous
num failed logins number of failed login attempts continuous
logged in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise discrete
num compromised number of “compromised” conditions continuous
root shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise discrete
su attempted 1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 otherwise discrete
num root number of “root” accesses continuous
num file creations number of file creation operations continuous
num shells number of shell prompts continuous
num access files number of operations on access control files continuous
num outbound cmds number of outbound commands in an ftp session continuous
is host login 1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 0 otherwise discrete
is guest login 1 if the login is a “guest”login; 0 otherwise discrete
Table 3.3: Content Fields Descriptions
Field Name Description Type
count number of connections to the same host as the cur-
rent connection in the past two seconds
continuous
serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous
rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous
same srv rate % of connections to the same service continuous
diff srv rate % of connections to different services continuous
srv count number of connections to the same service as the
current connection in the past two seconds
continuous
srv serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous
srv rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous
srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts continuous
The following fields apply to the destination host data
dst host count number of connections to the same host as the cur-
rent connection in the past two seconds
continuous
dst host srv count number of connections to the same service as the
current connection in the past two seconds
continuous
dst host same srv rate % of connections to the same service continuous
dst host diff srv rate % of connections to different services continuous
dst host same src port rate % of connections that have the same source port continuous
dst host srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts continuous
dst host serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous
dst host srv serror rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous
dst host rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous
dst host srv rerror rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous
Table 3.4: Traffic Fields Descriptions
32
different amounts of malicious activity, those intended for training and testing, and data
sets that attempt to emulate zero-day attacks.
A 10% subset of the KDD is also available which contains similar content as the origi-
nal. Because the 10% subset requires much less resources than the full data set and is still
representative of the content of the original, it will be used for all testing purposes. For the
remainder of this thesis, any reference to the KDD data set will refer to the 10% subset just
mentioned.
3.2.1 Malicious Content Variation
Many of the IDS systems and proposed algorithms discussed above gauge their perfor-
mance on the KDD data set. None, however, present their results in terms of varying
amounts of malicious activity. Very few mention the introduction of new kinds of attacks
into the data. For Intrusion Detection Systems, these should be important characteristics
of a proper test data set. To remedy this, the KDD data set was modified to reflect varying
amounts and types of malicious activity. The first data set created from the KDD set is a
modification of the amount of malicious activity contained in it. The original KDD data set
contains approximately 80% malicious activity. To test our proposed work on a range of
malicious volume, additional data sets were constructed with 0, 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 percent
attacks. This was done by iteratively removing every other attack line until the desired
amount of malicious activity was reached. This preserved the relative amounts of different
kinds of attacks existing in the original set, which is essential to testing algorithms that are
concerned with the relative amounts of data in the set, such as density-based clustering.
Table 3.5 shows a summary of the sets created.
3.2.2 Training, Validation, and Testing Sets
To test parts of the proposed work, such as signature creation, data sets for training, val-
idation, and testing were needed. There are different methods to go about this, including
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Subset Name % Attacks # lines
KDD full 80 494021
KDD 50 50 194556
KDD 25 25 129703
KDD 10 10 108086
KDD 5 5 102397
KDD 1 1 98260
KDD 0 0 97278
Table 3.5: Malicious Content Modifications
k-fold Cross-Validation and Bootstrap [20, 10]. In Kohavi’s analysis of these methods [20],
he claims that k-fold Cross-Validation with a k value of 10-20 is superior for the data sets
he used. Because the KDD data is similar to some of the data sets he used, such as the
‘soybean large’ data set with 35 fields and 19 label categories, Cross-Validation can be re-
liably used to partition the KDD data set. However, there are notable differences between
the data sets in Kohavi’s analysis and the KDD data.
The foremost of these differences is that the KDD set is much larger than the ‘soybean’
data set. This means that no ‘cross’ validation is needed because any selection will most
likely contain an example of every type of data. The process in Figure 3.1 demonstrates the
random selection and use of training, validation, and testing sets [7]. The size of the training
set needed for the Signature Creation algorithm to properly function will be determined
experimentally, rather than relying on the two-thirds shows in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Training Set Partitioning
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3.2.3 Dynamic Sets
The third set derived from the KDD set was an attempt to allow the system to approximate
a real-time analysis of a changing data set. A data set was needed to introduce attacks that
have not yet been processed by the system to determine its ability to adapt to new kinds of
attacks. This was done in the following way. If there are T attack types, let Ω be the set
of all attack types {t1, t2, . . . , tT}, where ti is the ith type. A subset of these attacks, Ω′,
is selected from Ω to represent the attacks that would ‘enter’ the data. Let Ω′ be equal to
{j1, j2, . . . , jL}, and L be the number of attack types in Ω′. Each instance of every attack
type in Ω was removed from the original KDD data set, leaving only the normal lines. This
new set with attack lines removed was divided into L+1 subsets. Let ∆ = {δ0, δ1, . . . δL},
where δi is the ith of these subsets. Attack types from Ω′ were added incrementally to each
successive subset, starting with δ1. Therefore, δ1 contains only attack type j1. The subset δ2
contains attack types j1 and j2, and so on. The attack types found in Ω but not Ω′ are added
to δ0, which is used for training SLCT and forming a baseline of signatures. Note that the
relative amounts of the attacks found in the original set were preserved in each subset.
This process was repeated for different selections of Ω′. Recall from Table 3.1 that
there are four categories of attacks. Each of these categories was designated seperately
as Ω′, as well as a selection of easily-clustered types according to the results of the ex-
periment above in Section 3.5.2. We call the dynamic sets with different selections of Ω′
KDD dynamic DoS, KDD dynamic R2L, KDD dynamic U2R, KDD dynamic surv, and
KDD dynamic mix.
Malicious content, training and testing, and dynamic attack modifications to the KDD
were used to test the three design components described in Chapter 2.
3.3 Performance Metrics
An essential part of performing an experiment is determining the measure of success and
failure, and how the outcome can be used for other purposes. Table 3.6 defines the terms
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used in IDS and clustering performance and characteristics. The two most common and
useful metrics for intrusion detection are detection rate and false positive rate, defined
below.
Symbol Term Description
A Attacks The number of lines that were attacks.
C Clusters The number of clusters.
ai Cluster Attack Fraction The fraction of lines in cluster i that is malicious.
χ Cluster Integrity See Equation 3.3.
ni Cluster Normal Fraction The fraction of lines in cluster i that is legitimate.
γ False Positives The number of lines that were incorrectly labeled as
attacks.
ρ Percent Clustered The number of lines that belong to valid clusters out
of the total number of lines.
pi Normals The number of lines that were normal.
κ Total Cluster Integrity See Equation 3.4.
τ True Positives The number of attacks that were correctly labeled as
such.
Table 3.6: Description of Performance Terms
DetectionRate(DR) =
TruePositives
Attacks
=
τ
A
(3.1)
FalsePositiveRate(FPR) =
FalsePositives
Normals
=
γ
pi
(3.2)
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves may be generated to summarize the
sensitivity of the system to user parameters. ROC curves are commonly used to show the
performance of binary classifiers by showing detection rate versus false positive rate for
different input parameter configurations. Though detection rate and false positive rate are
the most commonly reported metrics for an IDS, other metrics may be used to provide
insight into the system rather than reporting performance.
ClusterIntegrity = χ =
C∑
i=0
|ai − ni|
C
(3.3)
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TotalClusterIntegrity = κ =
C∑
i=0
|ai − ni|
C
× ρ (3.4)
Using Cluster Integrity (χ) allows us to verify our previous assertion that clusters con-
tain mostly malicious or mostly normal activity, and not a mix of the two. Total Cluster
Integrity (κ) allows us to assess the clustering algorithm’s ability to summarize the most
amount of data while seperating malicious activity from normal activity.
3.4 Parameter Configurations
3.4.1 Threshold Values
There are a small number of user parameters for the algorithms discussed in Chapters 1 and
2. For SLCT, the two parameters are the support threshold N , and the field selection Λ′.
The typical range of N can be anywhere from 0.001% to 10%, depending on the expected
size of the data set. A small N value may specify a threshold of only 1 or less, which
means every word will be considered dense and every line will be considered a cluster. An
N value too high may not allow the creation of any dense words or clusters.
The M parameter, used in SLCT attack has a range of 0% to 100%. An M value of
0% has no effect on SLCT, while a value of 100% enforces all fields in Λ′ to be used for a
valid cluster. Values in the range of 90% to 100% will be of interest, because it was noted
in preliminary experiments that it is around those values that normal clusters are in fact
distinguished from malicious ones.
3.4.2 Smoothing Constants
The real-time implementation of SLCT, named SLCT RT, has two additional user parame-
ters, α and β, which are smoothing constants for the supports of 1-regions and candidates.
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These two values can have an effect on the sensitivity of the algorithm creating new clus-
ters, as they determine how much historical support to consider as opposed to new support.
The lower the value, the less historical support will determine the density of a 1-region
or the validity of a cluster. With this in mind, a range of values from 0.1 to 0.9 will be
investigated for α and β.
3.4.3 Window Size
The size of the window ψ that is used to approximate real time in the data sets is also
important. The window size should be as small as possible while still being useful. A
range of 100 normal lines to 10000 normal lines will provide insight into how small a
window can be made before it cannot be usefully clustered by SLCT.
3.4.4 Field Selection
The field selection Λ′ can take on any subset of the 41 fields in the KDD data set. There
are, however, intuitive and interesting selections available that will be used. Indeed, it has
been claimed by works such as [6] that the field selection is important in obtaining good
classification results. The selections chosen can be found in Table 3.7. Some selections
were chosen arbitrarily to determine if non-intuitive selections would be of any use. The
three categories of fields (tcp, content, and traffic) were also chosen as seperate field selec-
tions to investigate their relative use. Refer to Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for descriptions of
the specific fields. Note that the names and indices of the fields apply only to the KDD Cup
’99 data, which is described in Section 3.1.1.
A preliminary experiment was performed to determine the most useful fields to distin-
guish between malicious and normal lines. We define Field Integrity as how often specific
attributes belonging to a particular field contribute to only normal or only malicious activ-
ity. A Field Integrity of 1 indicates that attributes in that field are always either a part of
only normal activity or only a part of malicious activity. The Field Integrity for a field fk
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can be expressed in Equation 3.5 thus:
FieldIntegrity =
∑
∀(xi,k)
|2 ∗ (xi, k).AttackSupport− 1|
A
(3.5)
where (x0,k), ..., (xA,k) are all the attributes that belong to field k. Using the expression
2 ∗ AttackSupport − 1 adjusts the attack support number to be highest when the field is
most indicative of malicious or normal activity. An attribute’s attack support of 0.5 means
that the attribute is contained in an equal number of malicious and normal activity. It
therefore is not a useful measure of how well a field can indicate malicious or normal status.
We therefore assign a field integrity score of 0 to attributes with an attack support of 0.5.
Likewise, we assign a field integrity score of 1 to attributes with attack supports of either
0 or 1. The final field integrity for field k is the average of these scores from individual
attributes’ attack supports. Using this definition, the Field Integrity was measured for each
field in the subset of the KDD data containing 50% malicious activity to provide unbiased
field integrity calculations. Figure 3.2 shows the results for each field.
Figure 3.2: Measured Field Integrity
The fields with the highest Field Integrity should be the most indicative of a line’s status.
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These fields include 0, 2, 4, 5, 16, 25, 30, and 31.
Name Field Numbers Description
all 0,1,...,40 All fields in the KDD data.
first four tcp 0,1,2,3 The first four, which can provide much information
about activity, contains duration, protocol, service,
and the number of bytes from source to destination.
tcp 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 The TCP fields, see Table 3.2.
first half 0,1,...21 First half of the fields, arbitrary
second half 22,23,...40 Second half of the fields, which are also the Traffic
fields. See Table 3.4.
second half odd 21,23...,39 Only odds of second half, arbitrary.
second half random 23,24,28,30,31,32,33,38,39 Very arbitrary selection.
middle 12,13,...,27 An arbitrary combination of Content fields and Traf-
fic fields.
content 9,10,...,21 The Content fields, see Table 3.3.
experimental 0,2,4,5,16,25,30,31 Fields with the highest Field Integrity, found exper-
imentally.
Table 3.7: Description of Λ′ Selections
3.5 Experiment Procedure
Using the system proposed above as well as the modified versions of the KDD data set,
a set of experiments were devised to investigate the different applications of clustering in
intrusion detection.
3.5.1 Task 1: Clustering-based IDS
The first experiment involves determining the ability of clustering as an IDS itself. A ten
percent subset of the KDD data was first modified for various amounts of malicious activity
as described in Section 3.2.1. For both SLCT norm and SLCT attack, the effect of a range
of N , M , and field selections on the detection rate and false positive rate was determined
across the varying malicious activity subsets. In other words, the input parameter sensitivity
was measured. For a general anomaly-based IDS, having a low parameter sensitivity is
essential for reliable performance. For both SLCT norm and SLCT attack to be reliable
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IDSs, they need a high detection rate, a low false positive rate, and an insensitivity to both
input parameters as well as the amount and type of malicious activity present in the data
set.
Another important investigation is on Cluster Integrity (χ) and Total Cluster Integrity
(κ). A high χ will affirm our assertion that clusters contain either mostly malicious or
mostly normal activity. A high κ will indicate the clustering algorithm’s information sum-
marizing ability, a characteristic which can in turn be used in signature formation and
adaptation. As with detection rate and false positive rate, the effect of a range of input pa-
rameters on χ and κ should be determined to find the best combination of user parameters,
N and Λ′.
3.5.2 Task 2: Signature Creation and Signature Analysis
The second experiment aims at finding acceptable conditions for signature creation using
SLCT with regard to the size of the training and testing sets used. The Signature Creation
algorithm is run on different sizes of training sets which produce sets of signatures. These
signatures are then used to analyze the testing sets to find the detection rate and the false
positive rate. Ultimately, this experiment will illustrate how well SLCT can create signa-
tures under supervision. This experiment will also indicate how large a training set needs
to be to create signatures, as well as the success of the signatures for each attack type.
3.5.3 Task 3: Adaptive Signatures
The third experiment aims at determining how well SLCT RT can be used to adapt and
create signatures in a dynamic situation. The first step in this process determines the best
combination of user parameters, ψ, α, and β, that can maintain a high Total Integrity for
SLCT RT. A 33% training set out of the total experimented KDD data set is first clustered
to establish a dictionary and set of cluster candidates. SLCT RT is then run using the Real-
Time Emulator on the remaining 66% testing set with varying user parameters to find the
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best average Total Integrity for all windows.
Next, we must verify that SLCT RT maintains a high Total Integrity which corresponds
to new attacks in a data set forming clusters. To do this, we use the dynamic sets described
above in Section 3.2.3. We will run SLCT RT using the values found from the first step
for ψ, α, and β on KDD dynamic DoS, KDD dynamic R2L, KDD dynamic U2R, and
KDD dynamic surv. The first subset of the dynamic sets is used to train SLCT RT. To save
time, one attack from each data set will be singled out to be studied. The attacks chosen
were teardrop, guess passwd, buffer overflow, and portsweep because there are a sufficient
number of them, and provide a fairly difficult challenge to cluster. The percent of these
attacks that successfully formed clusters will be reported for each dynamic set.
The final step adds the New Signature Classification algorithm. For each dynamic
set, the first subset is used to create a base of signatures, as well as train SLCT RT. The
training phase is also used to collect attributes’ attack supports using the ground truth of the
training set. This process is only done once for each data set, though it could be a real time
process based on the classifications given to new activity based on the set of signatures.
Next, the dynamic testing data is analyzed. As new clusters are created in a window, they
are classified according to the New Signature Classification algorithm, and the total set of
signatures is then used to analyze the window. From this experiment, we should be able to
determine the overall detection and false positive rates, as well as whether or not each new
attack was succesfully clustered and classified.
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Chapter 4
Simulation and Results
4.1 Clustering-based IDS
The clustering algorithm SLCT was tested as an IDS itself. The full range of user pa-
rameters was used to gauge the detection rate and false positive rate and determine the
set of parameters that yield the best performance, which is ultimately gauged by detection
rate and false positive rate. The algorithm’s sensitivity describes how much these metrics
deviate under different scenarios.
4.1.1 IDS Performance for SLCT norm
SLCT norm was used to classify each data set described in Section 3.5.1. In general,
SLCT norm exhibits a wide range of performance in terms of detect rate and false positive
rate across the different data sets tested. First of, the algorithm was very reliant on the
user parameters N and field selection. A ROC chart shown in Figure 4.1 illustrates this.
Each point on the chart represents a different parameter configuration, where N is in the
set {0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10} and Λ′ is any of the selections in Table 3.7.
The chart indicates that the algorithm is very sensitive to the user parameters because
the points on the chart are very spread out. In essence, different user parameter selections
will yield very different results. Selecting the correct user parameters for a given scenario
would therefore be very critical.
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Figure 4.1: ROC Analysis for SLCT norm
According to the ROC chart, SLCT norm’s performance is also very sensitive to the
amount of malicious activity contained in the data set. For the same range of input pa-
rameters, the points for 1% malicious content are contained to a clearly different region
that those for the 80% malicious content. Figure 4.2 shows this more clearly for one in-
put parameter selection. We see that for a single selection of N and Λ′, the detection rate
will vary considerably across different amounts of malicious activity. This characteristic
of SLCT norm’s detection rate is, of course, also related to the user parameter N . De-
spite the sensitivity to malicious content, Figure 4.2 also shows that cluster integrity is very
high regardless of the relative content of the data, indicating that SLCT performs very well
at seperating malicious and normal activity into seperate clusters. This will be illustrated
further in Section 4.1.3.
For some parameter selections, SLCT norm was able to achieve some insensitivity to
malicious content. Figure 4.3 shows the performance across the sets which stays fairly
even. The most obvious flaw, however, is that detection rate is very low and false positive
rate is fairly high. The performance shown in Figure 4.3 was the best SLCT norm could
achieve in terms of insensitivity, not taking into account actual detection and false positive
rates.
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Figure 4.2: SLCT norm Performance Across Varying Malicious Content
Figure 4.3: Acheived Insensitivity for SLCT norm
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4.1.2 IDS Performance for SLCT attack
SLCT norm did not perform well as a stand-alone IDS due to the dependence on user
parameters as well as the amount of malicious activity in the data. SLCT attack, the com-
plementary approach, uses another user parameter,M , to try and eliminate this sensitivity
by placing a threshold on the number of fixed attributes required for a valid cluster. Figure
4.4 shows one parameter configuration that achieved high detection rate and high false pos-
itive rate. Essentially, this corresponds to a high percent clustered, which was achieved by
using a value of 0.1 for N . A larger Λ′ selection was chosen so that more attributes would
be available for theM threshold to take effect on. The 0% malicious content data set was
also used so that the false positive rate during all normal activity could measured, which is
an interesting result for unsupervised anomaly-based systems.
Figure 4.4: SLCT attack Performance without M Parameter
In Chapter 2, we proposed that M may be able to help SLCT attack differentiate be-
tween clusters that contain malicious activity and clusters that contain normal activity. Us-
ing a configuration that is able to cluster the most amount of data will allow us to demon-
strate best the effect of theM parameter. Figure 4.5 shows the performance achieved when
applying M . It is clear that the detection rate is high and the false positive rate is low
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regardless of the malicious activity present in the data. This is the best configuration that
could be achieved by SLCT as a clustering-based IDS. Considering the high detection rate
and the relatively low false positive rate of current signature-based systems, however, this
is not sufficient performance. The false positive rate is much too high to be of any real
use, and the detect rate is probably not indicative of how many kinds of attacks were cor-
rectly labeled. However, Figure 4.5 does support our assertion that malicicous clusters
often contain more attributes than normal ones because the M parameter was in fact able
to distinguish between some malicious and normal clusters.
Figure 4.5: SLCT attack Performance Using M Parameter
4.1.3 Cluster Integrity Performance
Though SLCTmay not be well suited as a stand-alone IDS, it can possibly be used for other
purposes. As briefly mentioned before and displayed in Figure 4.2, the Cluster Integrity
(χ) was very high regardless of the amount of malicious activity present in the data. If χ
is in fact a useful characteristic of SLCT’s performance, then it follows that we should find
the user parameter configuration that optimizes it. Figure 4.6 shows the Cluster Integrity
on a data set with 50% malicious activity for a range of N and Λ′.
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Figure 4.6: SLCT Cluster Integrity Sensitivity
Note that some field selections are slightly worse than others across a range of N ,
namely content, middle, and second half random. In any case, the high χ for most N and
most fields verifies our previous assertion that clusters contain either mostly malicious or
mostly normal activity.
Eventually, we are interested in SLCT’s ability to summarize data. In other words,
it must be able to cluster as much data as possible while still maintaining χ. This we
defined as Total Integrity (κ). The first step is to determine which parameter configuration
yields high ρ, percent clustered. Figure 4.7 shows these results. The critical parameter
here is clearly field selection, and not N , yet the best value of N must still be determined.
From Figure 4.7, we see that the Λ′ selections that produce the highest ρ are tcp, first four,
first half, and content. We can naturally eliminate content due to its relatively low cluster
integrity seen in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.8 shows the average Total Integrity and average number of clusters across all
field selections for the specified values of N . Lower values of N , as expected, yield higher
Total Integrity due mostly to a higher Percent Clustered. However, lower values of N also
correspond to higher numbers of clusters as expected. Though a higher number of clusters
will more accurately describe the data being clustered, it can become cumbersome for the
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Figure 4.7: SLCT Percent Clustered Sensitivity
software in terms of computer resources. Since there is a local maximum of total integrity
at N = 2 which yields a small number of clusters, this will be the value selected.
Now that the value of N has been decided, we can determine the field selection that
yields the best κ. Figure 4.9 shows the Total Integrity for different field selections for
N = 2. The error bars show one standard deviation of the Cluster Integrity for each cluster
created, weighted by ρ. A high standard deviation would mean that some clusters had high
Integrity, while others were much lower than the mean. It is clear that first four is the
best selection having the highest average and a low standard deviation. The field selection
first four is also convenient because it is a very small one, which is computationally very
inexpensive.
4.1.4 Summary
The following conclusions were drawn concerning the usefulness of SLCT as an IDS:
• SLCT norm does not perform well as an IDS because it is too sensitive to user pa-
rameters and the amount of malicious activity in the data. This is because clusters
are too easily formed from malicious as well as normal activity.
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Figure 4.8: Average Total Integrity
Figure 4.9: Total Cluster Integrity by Λ′ Selection
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• Using the M parameter in SLCT attack can in fact improve SLCT’s performance as
an IDS, though it is still not satisfactory. Our assertion that malicious clusters contain
more fixed attributes was verified.
• Cluster Integrity for SLCT is very high for some parameter configurations, verifying
our assertion that valid clusters contain mostly malicious or mostly normal activity.
• Total Cluster Integrity is high for certain field selections. This can be taken advantage
of when using SLCT’s ability to summarize data.
• The best parameter configuration for a high Total Integrity is an N value less than or
equal to 2, and a field selection of first four.
4.2 Signature Analysis and Signature Creation
The purpose of this section is to determine if SLCT can successfully create signatures from
labeled training data. We can measure the success of this endeavor by looking at the detect
rate and false positive rate of the attack signatures when the Signature Analysis method is
run on the test data. Recall that the Signature Creation algorithm purposefully attempted to
reduce false positives using the validation set, so these are not expected to be significant.
Overall, the detection rate was around 99%, and the false positive rate much less than
1%. However, this is largely due to the flood of DoS-type attacks present in the data. For
example, instances of ‘neptune’ and ‘smurf ’ make up 95% of the malicious activity in
the KDD set. Because of this large variance in the amounts of different attack types, it is
more beneficial if we look at the performance for each attack type’s signatures individually.
Figure 4.10 shows the detect rates for each attack type for different sizes of training sets.
The attack types can be broken down into different categories depending on how their
signatures performed:
1. Types which performed well regardless of training and testing set size.
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Figure 4.10: Signature Detect Rates
2. Types that had good signatures if enough lines were present in the training set.
3. Types that never created good signatures, possibly because little or no lines were
present in the training set.
4. Types whose performance varied unpredictably with training set size.
Type 1, which generally performed well regardless of the training set size, were gen-
erally the DoS and surveillance attacks, including ‘back’, ‘ipsweep’, ‘land’, ‘neptune’,
‘nmap’, ‘pod’, ‘portsweep’, ‘satan’, ‘smurf ’, and ‘teardrop’. This category is by definition
more predictable in nature. A DoS attack is a flood of the same activity, and surveillance
contains predictable characteristics because it is concerned only with determining network
characteristics. Additionally, the amount of network activity for these types of attack is typ-
ically higher than others, which means even a smaller training set will contain a sufficient
number of attacks with which to form signatures.
Type 2 is similar to Type 1 in that the attacks are of a predictable nature, but a smaller
training set may not contain a sufficient number to form good signatures. These include
‘buffer overflow’, ‘load module’, and ‘guess passwd’. In this case, the signatures may not
actually have a very good detect rate, but it is worth to noting that the trend decreases as
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training set size decreases. It could be agrued, therefore, that signatures with very good
detect rates could be created from a training set with more instances of the attacks.
Type 3 includes ‘ftp write’, ‘multihop’, ‘perl’, ‘phf ’, ‘rootkit’, ‘spy’, and ‘warezmas-
ter’. Some of the training sets contained no lines for some of the attacks, and therefore did
not yield any signatures. In some cases, because of the small amounts of some of these
attacks in the original data set, the relative amounts were not preserved in the random se-
lection of the training subsets. This made it difficult to determine the effect of training set
size on signature performance. Other types, such as ‘warezmaster’, are made up of activity
that is too heterogeneous to be properly summarized by SLCT, and therefore difficult to
create signatures for. These attack types labeled as Type 3 were those whose performance
was never above 0%, and no conclusion could be drawn as to how well signatures could be
automatically created for them.
Type 4, which includes only ‘warezclient’ and ‘imap’, do not seem to exhibit a direct
relationship between detect rate and training set size. This phenomenon is probably related
to the iterative nature of the Signature Creation algorithm as well as the randomly selected
training and validation sets. Because the algorithm iterates over different values of Λ′ until
a low enough false positive is reached, signatures could use completely different fields from
one training set to another. This simple fact alone could create the unpredictable differences
in detect rate we see for these attack types.
It is clear that the Signature Creation algorithm proposed can create signatures with
some success, but needs modification. A process which is able to more finely select better
signatures would be superior to the one implemented.
4.3 Adaptive Signatures
The goal of this section is to demonstrate the ability of SLCT to classify new signatures in
a changing data set. First, the parameters ψ, α, and β must be determined. Next we will
demonstrate that SLCT RT does form clusters from new attacks. Finally, the performance
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of the New Signature Classification algorithm will be demonstrated.
4.3.1 Determining Window Size, Alpha, and Beta
The best values for a high Total Integrity for the SLCT parameters N and Λ′ were al-
ready determined in Section 4.1. The modified version of SLCT for real-time used, dubbed
SLCT RT, has three more user parameters ψ, α, and β. Here we will determine these values
of maintaining a high Total Integrity in near-real time; that is, from window to window.
In a real system, it would be most desireable to collect data in the shortest intervals
possible. This would allow a timely response to any occurring attack. In our system, this
translates to the smallest window size possible. A smaller window size will better emulate
a real system; though it must be large enough to contain meaningful data to be of use to
SLCT RT. UsingN = 2 and Λ′ = first four, window sizes of 100, 1000, and 10000 normal
lines were tested with different combinations of α and β. Recall that SLCT RT was first
trained on a 33% subset of the KDD data to build a Dictionary and form preliminary cluster
candidates. SLCT RT was then run on the remaining 66%. Figure 4.11 shows the Total
Integrity averages for the different parameter configurations. It is clear that a ψ value of
100 is not only sufficient, but superior to 1000 and 10000. This may be a result of the N
value chosen. Also recall that a lower value for α and β puts more emphasis on recent
activity than on historical data. As expected, a lower value for both α and β of 0.2 seems
to work better than 0.9 in maintaining Total Integrity, as it allows SLCT RT to adapt to the
new activity instantly.
4.3.2 Clustering New Attacks
Now that the user parameters ψ, α, and β have been determined, it is time to test SLCT RT
on a data set where new attacks enter. Table 4.1 shows the final selection of user parameters.
Ω′ describes the set of attacks that enter the data as emulated zero-day attacks, where
the different selections were split into the four categories of attacks: DoS, R2L, U2R, and
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Figure 4.11: Average Total Integrity
Parameter Value
N 2
Λ′ first four
α 0.2
β 0.2
ψ 100
Table 4.1: SLCT RT User Parameter Values
surveillance. Recall that only one attack from each of these categories was selected to be
of interest. Four experiments were performed, one for each of the dynamic data sets. For
example, SLCT RT was run on the data set KDD dynamic DoS, and the amount clustered
for the attack ‘teardrop’ was the only metric measured. This was also done for the other
three attack type categories and their respective dynamic data sets. At this point, we are
only interested in verifying that new attacks do form clusters. Table 4.2 shows the results
from this experiment. The column titled Number of Lines shows the number of lines that
were the specific type of attack. The column titled Number of Windows was the number of
windows that contained the specific attack, thus describing how spread out the attack lines
were throughout the data set. The table shows that most attacks do form clusters. This
means that signatures will be formed from these clusters, ideally being classified correctly
and detecting future attacks. Note that the DoS attack ‘teardrop’ had 100% clustered. This
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is expected because by definition, a DoS attack is made up of a large volume of the same
activity, which makes it easily clustered.
Attack Type % Clustered Number of Lines Number of Windows
teardrop DoS 100 163 5
guess passwd R2L 92.45 53 2
buffer overflow U2R 84.84 33 13
portsweep surv. 92.58 782 13
Table 4.2: Percent of Attacks Clustered with SLCT RT
4.3.3 Classifying New Clusters in Simulated Real Time
The final step is to apply the New Signature Classification algorithm to SLCT RT to de-
termine its effectiveness in detecting attacks that have never been analyzed by the system.
Table 4.3 shows the average detection rate and false positive rate for each of the Ω′ selec-
tions: DoS, R2L, U2R, surveillance, and the mix of all four. Recall that these Ω′ selections
were described in Section 3.2.3. To provide more detailed insight into the system’s perfor-
mance, Table 4.4 shows the detection rate of each attack type.
Data Set Detect Rate False Positive Rate
KDD dynamic DoS 29.65 0.47
KDD dynamic R2L 72.72 7.54
KDD dynamic U2R 71.43 8.16
KDD dynamic surv 80.82 5.97
KDD dynamic mix 39.35 7.28
Table 4.3: Average Performance for Final System
One feature to note is the difference between the DoS results and the rest of the results.
Both detection rate and false positive rate are significantly lower for DoS than for the other
Ω′ selections. This is caused by the signatures created for the DoS activity being mislabeled
as normal. One explanation for this, is that the signatures created for DoS attacks are too
similar to normal activity in the first four fields to be classified as attack signatures. For
example, the signature for ‘smurf ’ can be easily determined by looking at the raw KDD
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Data Set Attack Type Detect Rate (%)
back 0.00
Neptune 94.67
KDD dynamic DoS Ping of Death 0.00
Smurf 0.00
land 4.76
teardrop 0.00
ftp write 25.00
warezclient 73.00
warezmaster 80.00
KDD dynamic R2L phf 50.00
multihop 57.10
spy 100.0
imap 75.00
guess passwd 96.20
buffer overflow 70.00
KDD dynamic U2R loadmodule 66.67
perl 90.00
rootkit 90.00
ipsweep 98.80
KDD dynamic surv nmap 95.65
satan 27.13
portsweep 95.00
teardrop 0.00
KDD dynamic mix guess passwd 88.68
buffer overflow 90.00
portsweep 91.83
Table 4.4: Detect Rate by Attack Type
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data. Using the [word, position] format for attributes, this signature can be written as
follows.
(0, 0) (icmp, 1) (ecr i, 2) (SF, 3)
We also know from raw data inspection that the attributes (0, 0) and (SF, 3) are common in
both malicious and normal activity. The success of this signature’s classification therefore
depends on the relative amounts of malicious and normal activity in the training set: more
malicious activity will give these attributes higher attack supports. Recall that all attack
lines that did not belong to the Ω′ selection in the dynamic data sets were placed in the
training subset, δ0. Therefore, we know that the data set KDD dynamic DoS contains
much less malicious activity in its δ0 set than the other dynamic sets. This is because there
is much more DoS activity than the other types of attacks. We can therefore conclude that
one possible cause for the low detection rate of DoS attacks is the low attack support in the
training set for common attributes such as (0, 0) and (SF, 3). Conversely, the same principle
can be applied to explain the high false positive rates in the other selections of Ω′ due to
the large amount of DoS activity in the training sets.
One possible remedy to this weakness in the system’s performance would be to acquire
a real data set made in a similar manner to the modifications we performed on the KDD
data. In other words, using a data set produced in a real environment intended to be used
in this study would eliminate any effects that our modifications had on the results.
Also, further study into the use of distance-based clustering algorithms may prove
insight into possible performance improvements. These algorithms make better use of
continuous-valued fields, making it possible to use a larger selection of Λ′, which would
possibly increase accuracy.
The results obtained were similar to those collected in related works. The work in
[2] reported an average of 66.6% detection rate for unknown attacks, though on a much
smaller scale than our own. The results we obtained can be considered fairly good. The
classification has obvious flaws, but shows promise because a good number of attack types
58
were more or less successfully detected. The false positive rate for many of the attack
categories was too high, though maybe more analysis could be performed to reduce this.
Though the New Signature Classification algorithm did have some success in detecting
new attacks, it is apparent that performance is reliant on the content of the training set,
δ0. This means that attributes’ attack supports in only the first four fields can not reliably
classify all new signatures.
4.3.4 Summary
The proposed system was to some degree successful in detecting new attacks. Performance,
including both detection rate and false positive rate, were found to be slightly dependent
on the attacks in the training subset. This conclusion leads us to believe that attributes with
an established history and attack support are not indicative of a new signature’s status. In
other words, frequently occuring attributes will occur over time in significant amounts of
both malicious and normal activity.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
This work’s main contribution was to investigate the use of SLCT, a density-based cluster-
ing algorithm, as it can be applied to Intrusion Detection. It was first tested as a stand-alone
IDS with little luck, leading us to believe that few clustering algorithms would be of real
use by themselves in real scenarios. However, SLCT does have the ability to seperate
malicious from normal activity into clusters, summarizing a fairly large high-dimensional
data set. Using these characteristics, SLCT was first incorporated into a Signature Creation
algorithm. This algorithm could automatically produce signatures from ground truth with
varying success. Some attack types did not yield very good results, while others were easily
condensed into a small number of signatures.
SLCT was then adapted for real time use by adding the effect of smoothing constants
to words’ and candidates’ supports, as well as using a window in the Real-Time Emulator.
It was demonstrated that, for a data set where new attacks enter into it, SLCT can at least
form clusters from those new attacks. Further, SLCT was with some success able to prop-
erly label those clusters to immediately identify malicious activity. The main limitation of
the system was that common attributes’ attack supports were skewed by large amounts of
malicious activity in the training set. This method of clustering and classifying new data
may be of use with further research to the Signature-based IDS community for detecting
zero-day attacks in the short term, until more conventional and accurate signature creation
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methods can be applied.
This method may also be of use in other domains besides intrusion detection. Identify-
ing and classifying a new group of data which may have similar but not identical character-
istics to historical data could be applied to any real-time binary classifier or data collection
and summarization method.
The concepts proposed in this work are entirely experimental. Rigorous experimen-
tation and fine-tuning would be necessary for systems similar to the ones proposed to be
implemented in real system. The idea of attempting to classify a new signature shows
promise, which could be augmented with the items addressed in the next section.
5.2 Future Work
5.2.1 Other Clustering Techniques
Many clustering algorithms currently exist, some of which are intended for Intrusion De-
tection while others are only intended for log file analysis. Other clustering algorithms,
particularly distance-based ones, may provide other insights into clustering’s uses for sig-
nature creation and adaptation. This would be an easily performed extension of the work,
replacing SLCT and it’s definitions of clusters and signatures with another algorithm that
used a cluster centroid-based approach.
5.2.2 Temporal and Other Relationships in Clustering
As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, attributes alone are not wholly indicative of a siganture’s
status. The relationships between attributes, however, may provide further insight into
a signature’s classification. Temporal relationships would exist in a real network due to
automated components, both legitimate and malicious. Studies on forming temporal rela-
tionships between attributes and cluster candidates may also prove to be useful.
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5.2.3 Real Data or Implementation
The modifications made to the KDD data set were intended to produce data more repre-
sentative of real network data characteristics. Having a data set made for testing varying
amounts of malicious activity and detecting zero-day attacks would provide more accurate
insight into the benefits of clustering in intrusion detection.
The proposed systems are also candidate for a real-time implementation in a test net-
work. The algorithms themselves are completely suited for this purpose. The difficult part
of this type of study would be in the selection of the data format, setting up the test network,
and running background legitimate activity while executing specific attacks. Because the
KDD data set was processed from TCP data, it could also presumably be done in real-time
to stay consistent with the ‘connection’ format which is familiar to the systems currently
implemented. However, other formats could be investigated.
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